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As many of you know, I became a member of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
only a month ago. I am delighted to be giving my first 
speech as a governor at a conference that has resulted 
from the kind of international cooperation that I see 
as essential in today’s world. The joint sponsorship of 
this conference by the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (Chicago 
Fed) represents an extremely fruitful collaboration of 
researchers, market participants, and policymakers 
from both sides of the Atlantic. Having been a research 
consultant at the Chicago Fed for many years and hav-
ing visited the ECB numerous times since its found-
ing less than eight years ago, I have many friends at 
both institutions and am pleased to see so many of 
those friends here today.
In addition, I am delighted that the topic of this 
cooperative venture and my maiden speech is central 
counterparty (CCP) clearing. As an academic, I wrote 
several papers on clearing arrangements and partici-
pated in many conferences such as this one. I am very 
pleased to be in a room filled with others who share 
that interest. 
In recent years, public policymakers have dem-
onstrated growing interest and concern about the ef-
fectiveness of CCP risk management. In particular,  
in November 2004 the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the Group of Ten central 
banks and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) jointly issued comprehensive 
international standards for CCP risk management.1  
I have often cited CCPs for exchange-traded derivatives 
as a prime example of how market forces can private-
ly regulate financial risk very effectively.2 Indeed, it 
is hard to find fault with the track record of derivatives 
CCPs, many of which have managed counterparty 
risk so effectively that they have never suffered a 
counterparty default. 
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But perhaps it is not unreasonable to ask whether 
that track record will be maintained. I see that good 
track record as a result of innovations that, over time, 
produced organizational arrangements that have pro-
vided market participants with the incentives and ca-
pabilities to ensure effective CCP risk management, 
thereby serving the public interest as well as the inter-
ests of market participants. Significant changes to those 
arrangements could result in less effective risk man-
agement. Furthermore, some CCPs have begun to clear 
new products, some of which may be less liquid or 
more complex than exchange-traded derivatives, and 
thus may pose challenges to traditional risk-manage-
ment procedures. Finally, more intense government 
regulation of CCPs may prove counterproductive if it 
creates moral hazard or impedes the ability of CCPs to 
develop new approaches to risk management. As cross-
border activity becomes ever more important, regulatory 
differences across countries may become an increas-
ingly serious impediment to innovation by CCPs.
In my remarks today, I will begin by reviewing 
the historical development of CCPs. I do this not for 
antiquarian interest but because this history illustrates 
how market forces led to the evolution of organization-
al and contractual features that have created strong in-
centives for effective private regulation that addressed 
both market participants’ and public policymakers’ 
concerns about risk control. I will then discuss the 
possible implications of recent variations on traditional 
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involved in clearing certain new products, particularly 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. I will conclude 
with some views on how government regulation can 
provide an environment in which private regulation 
of CCP risk management continues to be effective.
Historical development of futures clearinghouses
My review of the historical development of cen-
tral counterparties will focus on the CCP for grain fu-
tures traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). 
I make no claim that a CCP first arose in the United 
States. Indeed, a number of coffee and grain exchanges 
in Europe had some form of CCP in the late nineteenth 
century, well before any U.S. exchange.3 Rather, I sim-
ply am more familiar with developments in Chicago, 
in large measure because of the time that Jim Moser 
spent digging through the CBOT’s archives while on 
the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.4 
Furthermore, the market forces that drove the evolu-
tion of risk controls at the CBOT likely produced a 
broadly similar evolution on other exchanges.
An important lesson from the CBOT’s experience 
is that a CCP emerged gradually and slowly as a re-
sult of experience and experimentation. Early on, the 
CBOT recognized the importance of creating incen-
tives for adherence to its rules, including the contrac-
tual obligations of counterparties to contracts traded 
on the exchange. Initially, the primary incentive was 
the threat that a member that defaulted on its obliga-
tions could be barred from the trading floor. No doubt 
this consequence was a powerful incentive for solvent 
members to meet their obligations, but an insolvent 
member might not have assigned significant value to 
the loss of trading privileges. By 1873, the CBOT 
recognized the importance of evaluating the solvency 
of its members and adopted a resolution stipulating 
that any member whose solvency was questioned must 
open its financial accounts to inspection and could be 
expelled if it refused to do so. Around the same time, 
the exchange introduced initial and variation margin 
requirements for contracts traded on the exchange 
and set strict time limits for the posting of margin de-
posits. Failure to post margin deposits would be con-
sidered a default on the member’s contracts.
The next step along the road to addressing private 
and public concerns about effective risk control was 
the CBOT’s creation of a clearinghouse in 1883. For 
many years, the clearinghouse was not a true CCP. 
Rather, as created, it was merely a mechanism to re-
duce transactions costs by calculating members’ net 
obligations to post margins and to settle contracts. In 
the event of a member’s default, the clearinghouse 
assumed no responsibility for settling the defaulting 
member’s trades or for covering the losses to other 
members that exceeded the amount of margin that the 
defaulting member had posted.
Only in 1925 did the CBOT form the Board of 
Trade Clearing Corporation (BOTCC), a true CCP that 
became the counterparty to all transactions on the  
exchange. With the creation of BOTCC, members of 
the exchange were required to purchase shares in the 
clearinghouse, and only the member-shareholders 
were permitted to use the facility.5 Members were 
also required to post their margin deposits with the 
clearinghouse. In the event of a member’s default,  
the clearinghouse would take responsibility for settling 
the defaulting member’s trades. The clearinghouse 
would seek to cover any losses incurred in settling 
the defaulter’s obligations by liquidating its margin 
deposit. But if the losses exceeded the value of the mar-
gin, the deficiency would be charged against the clear-
inghouse’s capital, including the capital owned by the 
nondefaulting members. If the losses were so severe 
as to deplete the clearinghouse’s capital, the members 
could be required to purchase additional shares.
This organizational arrangement has been adopted 
by many other CCPs, both for exchange-traded deriv-
atives and for cash securities transactions. I characterize 
this structure as a partial integration of the members 
of the exchange into a single unit because each mem-
ber is now at least in part financially responsible for 
the performance of the others’ obligations arising from 
contracts traded on the exchange.6 The mutualization 
of risk creates incentives for all of the exchange’s mem-
bers to support the imposition of risk controls that 
limit the extent to which the trading activities of any 
individual member expose all of other members to 
losses from defaults. Moreover, because the members 
own the clearinghouse, they have the capability to act 
on their incentives for effective CCP risk management.  
I see this alignment of incentives for effective risk 
management with the ability to act on those incen-
tives as the key to the strong historical track record  
of derivatives CCPs.
What is interesting and instructive about the his-
tory of these arrangements is that it illustrates how 
market forces can produce private regulations that  
address the concerns about safety, soundness, and 
broader financial stability. 
Potential challenges raised by recent changes 
to central counterparty organization
During the twentieth century, various changes 
occurred in the historical organizational arrangements 
that I have characterized as a partial integration of the 
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century, the pace of change seems to be accelerating. 
Some derivatives exchanges have remained integrated 
with their CCP, but even in those cases, there now 
tends to be less integration. Members of the exchange 
are seldom required to be members of the clearing-
house. Instead, members of the exchange may arrange 
to clear through other members, which are referred to 
as “clearing members.” When a clearing member 
agrees to clear for a nonclearing member, it becomes 
responsible to the clearinghouse for the obligations of 
the nonclearing member. Only the clearing members 
are required to buy stock in the clearinghouse or to con-
tribute to a clearing fund that would be used to cover 
losses from defaults by other clearing members, in-
cluding defaults on their obligations to perform on 
positions held by nonclearing members.
In recent years, an increasing number of exchanges 
have engaged unaffiliated CCPs to clear their trades. 
A “horizontal” integration of CCPs has replaced the 
“vertical” integration of an exchange and its CCP. Both 
horizontally integrated CCPs and vertically integrated 
CCPs have often arranged for insurance policies that 
limit the potential losses to their clearing members 
from defaults. Finally, many exchanges have converted 
from mutual associations of exchange members to 
for-profit corporations.
Clearly some of these changes have important 
implications for competition among exchanges. But 
they may also have implications for the effectiveness 
of risk management, which is the focus of my remarks 
today. As I have discussed, historically the key to ef-
fective risk management has been that the members 
of the exchange have borne the risk of losses from 
defaults and have had the capacity to institute risk 
controls (principally membership standards and mar-
gin requirements) that have limited those risks. The 
question then is whether any of these changes to the 
organization of CCPs have left those bearing the risks 
without the capacity to manage those risks.
I would caution against assuming that change is 
inherently risky. After all, as we have seen, the partial 
integration model that worked so well for so many years 
emerged only gradually as a result of experimentation. 
Moreover, thinking that “one size fits all” regarding 
the organization of financial markets is a mistake. That 
said, it seems critical that the organization of any CCP, 
including a CCP that follows the traditional partial-
integration model, should conform to a pair of broad 
principles. First, a CCP’s default rules need to be trans-
parent: The party that bears the risk of default (who 
has “skin in the game”) must be clear to all. Second, 
a CCP’s governance arrangements must provide those 
with “skin in the game” with substantial influence 
over the CCP’s risk controls.
New products
In recent years, appreciation of the possible ben-
efits of a well-organized CCP has been growing. CCP 
arrangements have been introduced in a wide variety 
of markets that had not previously been served by 
CCPs. In the United States, the New York Stock Ex-
change established a clearinghouse in 1892 and trans-
formed it into a true CCP in 1920. But, outside the 
United States, few securities exchanges established 
CCPs until late in the twentieth century. Today, a CCP 
is in place and functioning in nearly all major securi-
ties markets. Increasingly often, CCPs for securities 
clear trades, including trades and repurchase agree-
ments involving government bonds, in the over-the-
counter securities markets. Since 1999, the London 
Clearing House (now LCH.Clearnet) has been clear-
ing growing volumes of some types of OTC deriva-
tives through its SwapClear service.
The clearing of OTC derivatives is an especially 
interesting development. Although SwapClear has 
been gaining traction, it has been met with resistance 
from some OTC derivatives dealers. Some of them 
have argued that bilateral credit risk management, 
which uses many of the same techniques that CCPs 
use (netting and margin requirements), is highly ef-
fective. Moreover, not all OTC derivatives are suffi-
ciently standardized to be cleared. Consequently, some 
have expressed concerns that CCP clearing of “vanil-
la” products could increase the risks on noncleared 
“exotic” products by limiting the scope for bilateral 
netting of vanilla products against exotic products 
outside the CCP. Another consideration for the most 
creditworthy dealers may be the potential effect of 
CCP clearing on mitigating the competitive advan-
tage of their creditworthiness.7
With regard to systemic risk, the key question 
about the clearing of OTC derivatives is whether the 
risk-management techniques that have proved so ef-
fective in clearing exchange-traded products will prove 
equally effective in clearing products that are not as 
standardized. In particular, the clearing of OTC deriv-
atives tends to entail much less scope for offsetting 
transactions. As a consequence, if a default occurred, 
a huge volume of transactions would need to be closed 
out. The feasibility of a CCP’s achieving closeout 
promptly is clearly a critical issue that deserves care-
ful examination. In that regard, a recent report by 
leading participants in the OTC derivatives markets 
expressed concern about the feasibility of closeout 
procedures in the event of default of a large market 
participant in stressed market conditions.8 Further ex-
perimentation with closeout procedures may be nec-
essary to address that concern.40 4Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
The role of government
In recent years, policymakers have devoted much 
attention to oversight and regulation of CCPs, with 
the objective of promoting their soundness and stability. 
I certainly share that objective, but I would like to 
call attention to some possible unintended and unde-
sirable consequences of CCP regulation. The first is 
moral hazard. Policymakers must be very careful to 
avoid any impression that government oversight comes 
with a promise of government financial support in the 
event of a risk-management failure; otherwise, private-
market discipline, which has served private and pub-
lic interests in the stability of CCP arrangements so 
well for so long, may well be eviscerated. 
Instead, government regulation should focus on 
improving the effectiveness of private-market regula-
tion. In particular, it should enforce the observance of 
the two critical principles I identified earlier. First, it 
should ensure that a CCP’s risk-management policies 
and procedures, especially its policies for handling de-
faults and allocating the burden of losses from defaults, 
are transparent to market participants. Second, it should 
ensure that CCP governance arrangements provide 
the parties who would bear the losses with substantial 
influence over the CCP’s risk-management policies.
My sense is that policymakers are well aware of 
the risks that moral hazard poses for financial stability. 
But I am concerned that a second unintended conse-
quence of regulation has too often gone unrecognized. 
That is the potential for conflicting regulation (and 
laws) to impede the evolution of CCP arrangements, 
especially the potential for economies of scale and 
scope to be achieved through consolidation. I am al-
ways puzzled when I hear the United States held up 
as the model for the benefits of consolidation of the 
clearing and settlement infrastructure. We have achieved 
significant consolidation within the securities markets 
and within the futures markets. But I am struck by the 
lack of consolidation of securities and futures CCPs. 
Perhaps there is no business case for such consolida-
tion. Even if a business case exists, however, I believe 
consolidation would be difficult to achieve due to the 
legal and regulatory distinctions in the United States 
between securities and futures. 
Law and regulation seem also to be placing sig-
nificant barriers in the way of consolidation of the  
securities and derivatives clearing and settlement in-
frastructure in Europe. Most of the fifteen barriers to 
efficient cross-border clearing and settlement that were 
identified by the Giovannini Group report in 2001, 
seem to be grounded in law and regulation rather than 
in the practices of private-market participants.9
Policymakers in all countries need to examine 
whether legal and regulatory distinctions are imped-
ing innovation and, if so, whether the distinctions are 
meaningful and essential for the achievement of pub-
lic policy objectives. Policymakers must also resist 
the temptation to place regulation in the service of 
protectionism. I read with interest and appreciation 
European Union Commissioner McCreevy’s recent 
speech at the London School of Economics on the de-
velopment of the European capital markets, in which 
he decried the signs of a new wave of protectionism 
in Europe.10 As he noted, “Protectionism is a proven 
route to economic stagnation and decline.”11 This is 
an important message, indeed.
Conclusions
I find the history of financial markets to be enor-
mously instructive. My reading of the history of CCP 
clearing is that it teaches us that private-market regu-
lation can be effective for achieving the public policy 
goal of safety and soundness and broader financial 
stability. Government regulation and oversight should 
seek to provide an environment in which private reg-
ulation can be most effective. Government regulation 
should not place unnecessary barriers—domestically 
or internationally—in the path of the future evolution 
of private-market regulation. Innovation should be 
fostered, and regulatory protectionism should be 
rejected.41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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